THE PROBABILITY APPROACH TO GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH PRODUCTION by Martine Quinzii & Michael Magill
 
Working Paper Series






























http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_search.cfmTHE PROBABILITY APPROACH TO
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH PRODUCTION
Michael MAGILL
Department of Economics
University of Southern California








Abstract: We develop an alternative approach to the general equilibrium analysis of a stochastic
production economy when ﬁrms’ choices of investment inﬂuence the probability distributions of
their output. Using a normative approach we derive the criterion that a ﬁrm should maximize to
obtain a Pareto optimal equilibrium: the criterion expresses the ﬁrm’s contribution to the expected
social utility of output, and is not the linear criterion of market value. If ﬁrms do not know agents
utility functions, and are restricted to using the information conveyed by prices then they can
construct an approximate criterion which leads to a second-best choice of investment which, in
examples, is found to be close to the ﬁrst best.
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1. Introduction
Just as there are two ways of analyzing a random variable, so there are two approaches to modeling
a production economy under uncertainty. The ﬁrst approach introduces a set of states of nature
with ﬁxed probabilities of occurrence and lets ﬁrms’ actions inﬂuence the quantities of the goods
produced in each state: this is the approach introduced by Arrow and Debreu (1953, 1959), which
constitutes the reference model of general equilibrium. The second approach introduces a proba-
bility distribution over possible outcomes, and lets ﬁrms’ actions inﬂuence the probabilities of the
outcomes: this approach has not been systematically explored in general equilibrium1 and is the
focus of this paper. While the ﬁrst approach is analogous to modeling a random variable as a map
from a state space to the real line, the second studies a random variable through the probability
distribution it induces on the outcome (range) space. Since the real-world ﬁnancial contracts which
share the risks and direct investment activity of ﬁrms are typically based on outcomes and not on
primitive states of nature, we argue that the latter approach is a natural candidate for a general
equilibrium analysis of a production economy under uncertainty.
As far as the description of production possibilitiesis concerned, the state-space representationis
more general. Given a probabilityrepresentation in which investment aﬀects the probabilities of the
outcomes, there exists a state-space representation with ﬁxed probabilities for the states in which
investment inﬂuences the quantity of output in each state, and in which the induced probability
distribution on outcomes coincide with the probability representation.2 A simple example suﬃces
to illustrate the construction.3 Consider a ﬁrm with two possible outputs yL < yH and two
possible investment levels aL < aH. The probability approach models the probability p of the high
outcome as a function of investment, for example p(aL) = 1
4 and p(aH) = 1
2, reﬂecting the fact
that investment in higher grade personnel or equipment makes the probability of the high output
yH more likely. The same production possibilities can be described by a model with four states
1There is a general equilibrium literature with moral hazard which uses the probability approach (Prescott-
Townsend (1984 a,b), Kocherlakota (1998), Bisin-Gottardi (1999), Lisboa (2001)), Zame (2006)). Since in these
papers it is assumed that there is a continuum of agents or ﬁrms of each type who are subject to independent shocks,
probabilities become proportions and uncertainty in essence disappears. Thus the issues related to risk aversion and
aggregate uncertainty, which we study and which arise when there are ﬁnitely many agents and ﬁrms, are not studied
in these papers.
2Roughly speaking this is a modiﬁed version of Kolmogorov’s extension theorem which states that given a proba-
bility representation of a random variable by a distribution function F : | R → [0, 1], there exists a probability space
(Ω,F,P) such that the random variable can be viewed as a map from Ω to | R and the probability distribution induced
by P coincides wih F.
3We thank a referee for suggesting this example as a simple way of showing the relation between the state-of-nature
and the probability representation.1. Introduction 2
of nature and a production function f(aL) = (yL,yL,yL,yH), f(aH) = (yL,yL,yH,yH) in which
the probability of each state is 1
4 independent of the ﬁrm’s investment: investment now aﬀects the
quantity produced in each state. In both models the probability of a high outcome is 1
4 if investment
is low and 1
2 if investment is high, and the two models are equivalent for an investor with expected
utility preferences.
If description of production possibilities were the only criterion for the choice of a model, then
the choice would be clear: the state-of-nature model, being more general, should be the reference
model. However the description of production possibilities is only half the model. The other half
describes the contracts (markets) which are used to share risks and direct investment. A state-of-
nature model assumes that contracts are contingent on the exogenous states of nature, and in a
model with production, essentially the only case which yields a well-deﬁned objective for a ﬁrm is
when markets are complete with respect to the states of nature. In the probability model, states of
nature are left unspeciﬁed and the contracts are assumed to be contingent on the possible outcomes
of the ﬁrms’ investment. Implicit in this approach is the assumption that even if in principle with
“suﬃcient knowledge” the outcome of each ﬁrm’s investment could be traced back to primitive
causes—states of nature whose probability of occurrence is independent of ﬁrms’ actions—these
states are too diﬃcult to describe and/or to verify by third parties to permit contracts based on
their occurrence to be traded.4 That this assumption is realistic seems to be conﬁrmed by the
striking fact that the contracts which are used to ﬁnance investment and share production risks—
bonds, equity and derivative securities—are either non contingent or based on realized proﬁts and
prices, rather than on exogenous events with ﬁxed probabilities.
These security markets have undergone a remarkable development in the last thirty years with
the introduction of more and more derivative contracts. We will use this observation to justify
our assumption that the markets are suﬃciently rich to span the uncertainty in the outcomes of
the ﬁrms: this means that it is possible (at a cost) to ﬁnd a portfolio of bonds, equity contracts
and derivatives whose payoﬀ is one unit if a given outcome for the ﬁrms is realized, and nothing
otherwise. As Ross (1976) showed, in a two-period model this is always possible if a suﬃcient
number of options are introduced. In this paper we assume that this full spanning assumption is
4The diﬃculty of using the state-of-nature approach has mainly been discussed in the context of insurance (Ehrlich-
Becker (1973), Marshall (1976)). Marshall argues that the typical reason that the approach cannot be used is because
it would be “too costly” for insurance companies to specify precisely in a contract ex-ante, and to verify ex-post, the
states of nature that can lead to an accident and whose probabilities are independent of the actions of the insured
agent. Actual insurance contracts are written directly on the “value of the loss”, an economic outcome which is
typically easy to describe and verify, and whose probability of occurrence is almost certain to be inﬂuenced by the
actions of the insured agent.1. Introduction 3
satisﬁed. In the formal model the full spanning assumption appears as the assumption that for each
possible outcome there is a contract which delivers one unit of income if this outcome is realized
and this contract has a well deﬁned price at the initial date.
The full spanning assumption in a probability representation of a production economy is typi-
cally much less restrictive than the assumption of complete markets in the associated state-space
representation. If contracts are based on outcomes and there is full spanning, then the number
of independent securities is equal to the number of outcomes. If the probabilities of outcomes are
inﬂuenced by investment, but the probabilities of the states are to remain independent of invest-
ment, then any state-space representation must have more states than outcomes, so that markets
are necessarily incomplete in the sense of GEI. In the simple example given above, although it is
convenient to choose a representation with four equiprobable states, we could make do with three
states, but no less: in order that the probability of the high output is diﬀerent when the investment
levels diﬀer, there must be at least one state in which high investment results in the high outcome
and low investment results in the low outcome. Thus there must be more states than outcomes
and markets are incomplete.
Since there is no satisfactory resolution of the choice of the objective function for ﬁrms when
markets are incomplete, if we take as a stylized fact that contracts depend on outcomes, then there
is no point in adopting a state-space representation of a production economy. It is better to proceed
directly to a new analysis of equilibrium using the probability representation.
We consider therefore a simple two-period model of a production economy in which ﬁrms make
investment decisions at date 0 which inﬂuence the probability distribution of their output at date 1.
If we anticipate that under favorable conditions an equilibrium will be Pareto optimal, then the ﬁrst
task is to derive what ﬁrms “should do”, namely the criterion that they should adopt to lead the
economy to Pareto optimality : we can then discuss whether ﬁrms will have an incentive to adopt
such a criterion. The ﬁrst-order conditions for Pareto optimality lead to a nonlinear criterion which
expresses a ﬁrm’s contribution to the social utility of date 1 output, net of the cost of investment
at date 0.
Let us try to explain in an intuitive way why such a criterion emerges when we use the proba-
bility approach, and why it diﬀers from the standard market-value criterion when the state space
representation is used. Note ﬁrst that when the distribution of aggregate output among consumers
is eﬃcient and agents have Von-Neumann-Morgernstern preferences, the social utility of date 1
consumption (output) is of the form
P
s∈S psΦ(Ys) where (ps)s∈S are the probabilities, (Ys)s∈S is
aggregate output and Φ is a social utility function. If we adopt a state-space representation, then1. Introduction 4
S is the set of states of nature, for each s ∈ S the probability ps is ﬁxed, and ﬁrms’ investments








∂ak, where yk is the output of ﬁrm k, and since
the prices are the marginal social utilities (psΦ0(Ys))s∈S, the marginal revenue of ﬁrm k coincides
with the marginal social beneﬁt of investment. Thus when markets are complete maximizing the
present value of proﬁt (the market value of the ﬁrm) leads to an eﬃcient choice of investment. If on
the other hand we adopt the probability representation, then S denotes the the set of possible date
1 outcomes of the ﬁrms, and the ﬁrms’ investment decisions a inﬂuence the probabilities ps(a):





the probability representation it is social utility rather than marginal utility which deﬁnes a ﬁrm’s
investment criterion.
Applying a normative approach to the probability representation of production thus leads to
a concept of equilibrium, which we call a strong ﬁrm-expected-utility (SFEU)equilibrium, in which
investors(consumers) share risks on markets, and ﬁrms choose investment to maximize the expected
social utilitycriterion. The qualiﬁer “strong” refers to the strong informational assumption required
to implement such an equilibrium: to know the social utility function, ﬁrms must know all the
individual agents’ utility functions—in particular their risk aversion. So at ﬁrst sight with the
probability representation, prices seem to have lost their fundamental role of conveying all the
requisite information to ﬁrms. However all is not lost. For what ﬁrms need to know to make socially
eﬃcient investment decisions are diﬀerences in social utility associated with diﬀerent outcomes, and
this, or at least an estimate of it, can be obtained by “integrating” the marginal utilities whose
values are given by the prices. Thus in the end ﬁrms can back out an estimate of the social utility
function from the prices, so that prices once again convey the requisite information to ﬁrms.
To formalize this informational role of prices we introduce a new concept of constrained opti-
mality: this is a Pareto optimum constrained by the condition that the “planner” does not have
access to more information regarding agents’ utility functions than that conveyed by the prices,
and we call this a second-best optimum. The concept of equilibrium which satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order
conditions for second-best optimality is then called an FEU equilibrium. In such an equilibrium
each ﬁrm constructs an estimate of the social utility function using the information on marginal
utilities contained in the prices, and then chooses its investment to maximize its contribution to
expected social welfare using this estimated social utility function.
As Arrow (1983) pointed out, when a stochastic production model departs from the state-
of-nature representation, lack of convexity may present problems. In Section 6 we examine the2. Probability Approach to Production Economy 5
convexity (concavity) assumptions needed to obtained existence and (constrained) optimality of
equilibrium. Unlike in the state-of-nature model, with the probability model the convexity as-
sumptions needed to prove existence of an equilibrium are weaker than those needed to obtain
optimality. To get existence, it suﬃces to have a stochastic version of decreasing returns to scale
for the investment of each ﬁrm. This however is not suﬃcient to imply the joint concavity assump-
tion on the upper-cumulative distribution function of aggregate output needed to prove optimality
of equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of a production economy using
the probability approach. Section 3 contains the ﬁrst-best analysis which leads to the expected
utility criterion for each ﬁrm and the associated concept of a strong FEU equilibrium. Section 4
introduces the concept of second-best optimality where agents’ utility functions are not known, and
Section 5 studies the related weaker concept of an FEU equilibrium in which ﬁrms only need to know
prices. Section 6 establishes the normative properties of an FEU and a strong FEU equilibrium,
and gives conditions under which an equilibrium exists. Section 7 concludes with some remarks on
directions for future research.
2. Probability Approach to Production Economy
This section presents the basic model of a production economy using the probability approach. To
contrast the properties of this model, in which actions inﬂuence probabilities of outcomes with the
properties of the standard state-of-nature production model, we focus on the simplest model of
a two-period ﬁnance economy in which agents have separable Von-Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
and the only risks to which they are exposed are those which come from the production sector.
Consider therefore a two-period economy (t = 0,1), with a single good (income) and a ﬁnite
number of agents (i = 1,...,I) and ﬁrms (k = 1...,K). Each ﬁrm makes an investment at date 0
which leads to a probability distribution over a ﬁnite number of possible outcomes (output levels)
at date 1. Let ak ∈ |R+ denote the investment (action) of ﬁrm k at date 0 and let yk denote the
date 1 random output which can take the Sk values (yk
1,...,yk
Sk), ranked in increasing order. With
a slight abuse of notation we let Sk denote the index set for the possible output levels of ﬁrm k






. The outcome space for the economy is S = S1 × ...SK which describes all
5In this paper we use the same capital letter for a set and the number of its elements: thus I is the number as
well as the set of agents, K is the number as well as the set of ﬁrms, ....2. Probability Approach to Production Economy 6
the possible outcomes for the K ﬁrms of the economy. Thus if s = (s1,...,sK) is an element of
S, then the associated vector of outputs of the K ﬁrms is ys = (y1
s1,...,yK
sK). Using standard
notation for a vector of random variables, let y = (ys)s∈S denote the ﬁnite collection of possible
outputs for the ﬁrms at date 1 and let Y =
P
k∈K yk denote the associated aggregate output. For
s ∈ S, let ps(a) denote the probability of outcome s when the investment levels of the ﬁrms are
a = (a1,...,aK) ∈ |RK
+: we assume ps(a) > 0 for all s ∈ S and a ≥ 0.
Assumption FS (full support): The function p(a) = (ps(a))s∈S is diﬀerentiable6 on |RK
+ and
for each investment level a ∈ |RK
+, the support of p(a) = (ps(a))s∈S is equal to S.
Assumption (FS) implies that all outcomes (yk
sk)sk∈Sk of ﬁrm k are possible for any level ak of
investment: this may seem restrictive since it excludes the case of certainty where the output of a
ﬁrm is a deterministic function of its input, or the case where only some of the values (yk
sk)sk∈Sk are
possible with a certain level of investment. These cases can however be approximated by placing
positive but very small probability on the appropriate part of the ﬁxed support S. When we
analyze the investment decision of a particular ﬁrm k, it is often convenient to write the outcome
s as s = (sk,s−k) where s−k = (s1,...,sk−1,sk+1,...,sK), and use the same convention for the
ﬁrms’ investment decisions a = (ak,a−k).
Each agent i ∈ I has initial resources consisting of an amount wi
0 of income at date 0, and
initial ownership shares δi = (δi
k)k∈K of the ﬁrms: agents have no initial endowment of income at
date 1, so that all consumption at date 1 comes from the ﬁrms’ outputs.









k = 1, for all k ∈ K.
Assumption (IN) implies that agents have no idiosyncratic risks and that all the risks in the
economy are production risks: agents’ consumption streams will thus only vary with the outputs
of the ﬁrms. Let xi = (xi
0,(xi
s)s∈S) denote a consumption stream for agent i. We assume that
agent i’s preferences, represented by the utility function Ui, are separable across time and have
the expected utility form for future risky consumption. To avoid boundary solutions which are not
natural in a one-good (income) model, we assume that the marginal utility of consumption tends
to inﬁnity when consumption tends to zero: we say that a function f : |R+ → |R satisﬁes the Inada
condition if limf(x) = +∞ when x → 0+.
6For brevity, we use the convention that “diﬀerentiable” means “continuously diﬀerentiable”.3. First-Best Analysis and Strong FEU Equilibrium 7
Assumption EU (expected utility): For each i ∈ I, there exist increasing, diﬀerentiable,
strictly concave functions (ui
0,ui









An agent’s utility Ui(xi;a) depends not only on the consumption stream xi but also on the
probability p(a) of the outcomes, which is determined by the investments a made by the ﬁrms at
date 0. It is convenient to let E(U,w0,δ,y,p) summarize the above economy, in which the agents’
utility functions are U = (Ui)i∈I, their endowments are w0 = (wi
0)i∈I and δ = (δi)i∈I, and the
production possibilities are represented by the ﬁrms’ outcomes y and the probability function p.
3. First-Best Analysis and Strong FEU Equilibrium
In this section we show how the ﬁrst-order conditions for Pareto optimality lead to the ﬁrst



















s = Ys, s ∈ S (1)
An allocation (¯ a, ¯ x) is Pareto optimal if and only if, for some weights µ = (µi)i∈I ∈ |RI
+ \ 0, it is a





















subject to the feasibility constraints (1).
If (¯ λ0,(¯ λs)s∈S) are the Lagrange multipliersassociated with the feasibilityconstraints, the FOCs
for an interior solution to the maximization problem (2) are
µiui0
0(¯ xi
0) = ¯ λ0, µips(¯ a)ui0
1(¯ xi










s) = ¯ λ0, k ∈ K (4)
The FOCs (3) express the equalizationof the marginal rates of substitutionof the agents required for
an eﬃcient distributionof output among agents: these conditions will be satisﬁed if marketsare used
to allocate the available output of ﬁrms to the agents. Since the FOCs (4) for investment involve
the agents’ utility functions, they do not coincide with the ﬁrst-order conditions for maximizing3. First-Best Analysis and Strong FEU Equilibrium 8
ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The FOCs can be written in an equivalent form which is useful for our analysis by
exploiting the separability of agents’ preferences.
For ﬁxed ¯ x0 = (¯ xi
0)i∈I, the function Φ¯ x0 : |R+ → |R deﬁned by




























. Φ¯ x0(η) is the maximum social welfare
that can be attained by distributing η units of good to I agents with utility functions (ui
1)i∈I, when
the weight of agent i in the social welfare function is 1/ui0
0(¯ xi
0). Using the ﬁrst-order conditions and
the properties of ui
1, it is easy to see that (ξ∗











= π∗, i ∈ I
Using the envelope theorem it is then easy to see that Φ0
¯ x0(η) = π∗ (see e.g Magill-Quinzii (1996)
for properties of the sup-convolution function).










= ¯ πs, ∀s ∈ S, ∀i ∈ I (6)
Such a common vector of marginal rates of substitution between date 0 consumption and consump-
tion in outcome s at date 1 is called a vector of stochastic discount factors. Given the properties









so that the FOCS (3) and (4) are equivalent to the existence of a vector ¯ π of stochastic discount





(¯ a)Φ¯ x0(Ys) − 1 = 0, k ∈ K (7)
To ﬁnd a concept of equilibrium which leads to Pareto optimal allocations, note that the
ﬁrst-order conditions (7) will hold if each ﬁrm k chooses ak to maximize the objective function
V k(ak,¯ a−k) deﬁned by
V k(ak,¯ a−k) =
X
s∈S
ps(ak,¯ a−k)Φ¯ x0(Ys) − ak (8)
V k(ak,¯ a−k) is the contribution of ﬁrm k to the (discounted) expected social utility when its invest-
ment is ak and the investments of other ﬁrms are ¯ a−k. The utility function in ﬁrm k’s objective3. First-Best Analysis and Strong FEU Equilibrium 9
depends on the preferences of all agents7 through (5) and depends on aggregate output rather than
just the output of ﬁrm k: this is because the social value of ﬁrm k’s output depends of the output
of the other ﬁrms to which it is added. Let Y −k
s−k denote the output produced by ﬁrms other than








sk(ak), then V k can be written as















sk;¯ a−k) − ak
where the utility function Ψk for the output of ﬁrm k is the average value of the social utility
obtained by adding yk to the output of other ﬁrms—an average which depends on the probability
of the total output of the other ﬁrms, and thus on these ﬁrms’ investments. If the outcomes
are correlated rather than independent, Ψk will also depend on ak since it will be a conditional
expectation rather than a simple expectation of Φ¯ x0(yk + Y −k).
As usual it is helpful to decompose the equilibrium of a production economy into two parts—an
equilibrium in the allocation of consumption among agents which takes place through markets,
and an equilibrium in the choice of investment by the ﬁrms. Consider ﬁrst an equilibrium in the
allocation of consumption: since the investment of ﬁrms is taken as given, we may call this a
consumption equilibrium with ﬁxed investment. Let P = (P0,(Ps)s∈S) denote the vector of prices
at date 0 for delivery of income at date 0 and in the diﬀerent outcomes at date 1: thus Ps (resp
P0) is the price at date 0 of a promise to deliver one unit of good (income) at date 1 in outcome s
(resp at date 0). It is natural to normalize the prices so that P0 = 1. We let P1 = (Ps)s∈S) denote
the vector of present-value prices for income at date 1. Thus P = (1,P1).
Deﬁnition 1. (¯ x, ¯ P) ∈ |R
I(S+1)
+ ×|RS+1
+ is a consumption equilibrium with ﬁxed investment ¯ a ∈ |RK
+,
for the economy E(U,w0,δ,y,p), if







to the budget constraint





k( ¯ P1yk − ¯ ak) (9)
7This is the main diﬀerence between the expected utility criterion which emerges in our approach from the ﬁrst-
order condition for optimality, and the objective postulated in Radner (1972). Radner assumed that each ﬁrm
maximizes the expected utility of its proﬁt, but did not link the exogenously given utility function of the ﬁrm to the















sk, ∀s ∈ S
A consumption equilibrium with ﬁxed investment is a standard competitive equilibrium of an







kyk). It can also be interpreted as an equilibrium in which agents trade Arrow securities
based on the ﬁrms’ outcomes or, equivalently, as the reduced form of an equilibrium in which agents
have initial equity in the ﬁrms and trade securities whose payoﬀs are based on the proﬁts of the
ﬁrms—equity contracts, bonds, options, indices on options— which are suﬃciently rich to span
the outcome space S. Thus implicit in Deﬁnition 1 is the assumption that the securities in the
extensive-form equilibrium satisfy the full spanning condition with respect to outcomes.
Note that in Deﬁnition 1, from the point of view of investors the ﬁrms’ outcomes play exactly
the same role as the states of nature in the standard GE model. Since investors take the ﬁrms’
investment decisions ¯ a as independent of their trades, the probabilities (ps(¯ a)) are ﬁxed and the
exchange part of the model is an Arrow-Debreu economy in which uncertainty is modeled by the
“states” s ∈ S. Thus while the distinction between states of nature and outcomes is crucial for
a production economy in which ﬁrms’ actions inﬂuence outcomes, it is irrelevant for an exchange
economy.8
We now extend this concept of equilibrium to include the choice of investment by ﬁrms. Since
ﬁrms maximize an expected utility criterion and since this concept leads under appropriate as-
sumptions to ﬁrst-best optimality, we call it a “strong ﬁrm-expected-utility” (SFEU) equilibrium.





+ is a strong ﬁrm-expected-utility equilibrium (SFEU
equilibrium) for the production economy E(U,w0,δ,y,p) if
(i) (¯ x, ¯ P) is a consumption equilibrium with ﬁxed investment ¯ a
(ii) for each ﬁrm k ∈ K the investment ¯ ak maximizes the expected social utility of its investment
V k(ak,¯ a−k) =
X
s∈S
ps(ak,¯ a−k)Φ¯ x0(Ys) − ak
where Φ¯ x0 is the social utility function deﬁned by (5).
The expected utility criterion V k seems rather far removed from the standard criterion for
a ﬁrm: let us show however that when ﬁrms are inﬁnitesimal, it essentially coincides with the
standard market-value (present-value-of-proﬁt) criterion.
8This probably explains why ﬁnance, which takes the payoﬀs of securities as given when studying asset pricing
and portfolio theory, is based on the state-of-nature model.3. First-Best Analysis and Strong FEU Equilibrium 11
Marginal ﬁrms: convergence of V k to market value. Consider the case where ﬁrm k’s output
is “small” in a sense made precise below and where its investment does not aﬀect the probability
of the other ﬁrms’ outcomes. We formalize this latter no-externality condition in the following
assumption:
Assumption NE (no externality): For all a ∈ |RK
+ and s ∈ S, the probability that the ﬁrms




Firms’ outcomes can be stochastically dependent because they are subject to common shocks
even though the investment of any ﬁrm has no direct eﬀect on the probability of other ﬁrms’
outcomes. Suppose for example that there is a vector γ of unobservable common shocks, with
distribution function H, which aﬀects the probabilities of the ﬁrms’ outcomes and that, conditional






and Assumption NE is satisﬁed even though the ﬁrms’ outcomes are stochastically dependent.
Since aggregate output is the sum of ﬁrm k’s output and the output of all other ﬁrms, Ys =
yk
sk +Y −k
s−k, the objective function V k can be expressed using the Taylor formula around Y −k: there
exists (θk
s)k∈K,s∈S with 0 ≤ θk






























of the utility function Φ¯ x0, for ξ lying in the range of values taken by Y −k and Y , where we assume
that these random variables take values bounded away from 0. We say that ﬁrm k is marginal if






< ￿ for all sk ∈ Sk, s−k ∈ S−k.






















sk (11)4. Non-Marginal Firms and Second-Best Analysis 12
By Assumption NE the ﬁrst term on the right side of (10) does not depend on ak and can thus be
omitted from the objective of ﬁrm k. In view of (11) if ￿ is suﬃciently small, the quadratic term in
(10) is negligible relative to the linear term which can be written as
Ea(Φ0
¯ x0(Y −k)yk) = Ea(Φ0
¯ x0(Y −k))Ea(yk) + cova(Φ0
¯ x0(Y −k),yk)
Since ￿ is small and Y −k
s−k ≤ Y −k
s−k + yk
sk ≤ Y −k
s−k(1 + ￿), Ea(Φ0
¯ x0(Y −k)) is close to Ea(Φ0
¯ x0(Y )) = 1
1+¯ r,
where ¯ r is the interest rate implied by the price vector ¯ P. Thus for a marginal ﬁrm the criterion
V k can be replaced by the criterion














Removing the quadratic term in (10) implies that ﬁrm k does not worry about its own risk in its
choice of investment, but only takes into account the covariance of its output with the stochastic
discount factor. The criterion b V k is similar to the criterion which leads to optimality in the state-
of-nature approach with complete markets: for b V k(a) =
P
s∈S ps(a)¯ πsyk
s − ak, so that b V k is just
the present value of the proﬁt of ﬁrm k, or equivalently its market value.
4. Non-Marginal Firms and Second-Best Analysis
One of the powerful conclusions of the Arrow-Debreu state-space approach is that proﬁt max-
imization leads to eﬃciency, regardless of the size of the ﬁrms which are considered, provided the
ﬁrms are price takers and do not seek to manipulate prices. One may discuss whether the price-
taking behavior is realistic for large ﬁrms but, in the setting of capital markets, taking security
prices as given is widely regarded as a good approximation, even for large corporations. Under these
conditions, when the Arrow-Debreu state-space approach is applied to capital markets, all ﬁrms,
both marginal and non-marginal, should seek to maximize market value. An important corollary
of this conclusion is that a ﬁrm needs no further information about the preferences and technology
of other consumers and ﬁrms than that contained in the prices. If, with current and anticipated
prices, proﬁt cannot be increased, then the ﬁrm’s investment is optimal both for its shareholders
and for the economy as a whole.
In the probability model the criterion V k for a ﬁrm, which comes from the normative analysis,
requires knowing the social welfare function Φ¯ x0 and this in turn requires knowing the utility
functions of the consumers. This is a demanding requirement, since revelation of preferences is
problematic both because of the amount of information that needs to be transmitted and because4. Non-Marginal Firms and Second-Best Analysis 13
of the distortions typically created by incentives. Do prices in the probability model loose all
their usefulness for conveying the information about the preferences of consumers? Intuitively this
should not be the case since what ﬁrms need to know are utilities, or more precisely as we shall
see, diﬀerences in utilities, and prices signal marginal utilities.
To study the the information that can be conveyed by prices in the probability model, we
explicitly introduce the assumption that ﬁrms do not know agents’ utility functions, but seek to
maximize a criterion which is their best estimate of the criterion V k. To show how such a criterion
can be found, we ﬁrst introduce the concept of a second-best optimum which explicitly takes into
account the informational constraint that agents’ utility functions are not known. In the next
section we show how to derive the approximate criterion by analyzing the FOCs for a constrained
eﬃcient allocation.
To describe the ‘best’ outcomes that can be achieved when ﬁrms do not know the utility func-
tions of consumers, we need to modify the usual concept of Pareto optimalityto take this constraint
into account. While ﬁrms do not have access to direct information on the utility functions (Ui)i∈I,
they do know something about consumers’ preferences since they can observe the prices associated
with a consumption equilibrium (x,P), and this gives information on the common marginal rates
of substitution of the consumers at the equilibrium consumption x. We are thus led to consider
allocations (a,x,P) in which the consumption component x can be achieved, for some character-
istics of the consumers, by trading on markets at prices P when investment is ﬁxed at a. We call
such allocations (a,x,P) “constrained feasible” because they incorporate the constraint that the
consumption component x is achieved through trading on markets at prices P.9 When the ﬁrms’
investment a is ﬁxed, the utility function Ui(xi,a) of an agent satisfying EU is characterized by
the pair (ui
0,ui
1): we write Ui = (ui
0,ui
1) and let U = (Ui)i∈I denote the proﬁle of utility functions
of the I consumers. This leads to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3. (a,x,P) is a constrained feasible allocation if for some proﬁle of utility functions U
satisfying EU, and of endowments (w0,δ) satisfying IN, (x,P) is a consumption equilibrium with
ﬁxed investment a.
In the consumption equilibrium (x,P) with ﬁxed investment a, the ﬁrst-order conditions of





= Ps, s ∈ S, so that the stochastic
9Introducing prices in the deﬁnition of a constrained feasible allocation is also used in the state-of-nature general
equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI) to study the best that can be achieved under the constraint that
ﬁnancial markets are incomplete (see Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis (1986), Geanakoplos-Magill-Quinzii-Dr` eze (1990)
and the ensuing literature).4. Non-Marginal Firms and Second-Best Analysis 14




, s ∈ S (13)
The following monotonicity properties of a consumption equilibrium play an important role in the
second-best analysis. Let xi
1 = (xi
s)s∈S denote the date 1 part of the agent’s consumption stream
xi.
Proposition 1: (Monotonicity) Let (x,P) be a consumption equilibrium with ﬁxed investment
a and let π be the associated stochastic discount factor. Then
(i) each agent’s date 1 consumption vector xi
1 is comonotone with date 1 aggregate output Y ,
i.e. Ys0 ≥ Ys implies xi
s0 ≥ xi
s, and Ys0 > Ys implies xi
s0 > xi
s, for all s,s0 ∈ S
(ii) the stochastic discount factor π is antimonotone with date 1 aggregate output Y , i.e. Ys0 ≥ Ys
implies πs0 ≤ πs, and Ys0 > Ys implies πs0 < πs, for all s,s0 ∈ S.
These are well-known properties of Pareto optimal allocations in economies with separable
preferences (see e.g. Magill-Quinzii (1996)): when risk markets are complete, in particular when
there are no uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, all agents consume more when aggregate output is high
than when aggregate output is low. However the variability of an agent’s consumption depends on
his/her risk-aversion, the consumption of a risk-tolerant agent varying more than that of a more
risk-averse agent. This monotonicity property implies that, for given production of other ﬁrms, if
ﬁrm k produces more, all agents consume more.
Given the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics, the statement that (a,x,P) is a constrained
feasible allocation can be replaced by the statement that (a,x) is a feasible allocation and that,
for some utility functions, the agents’ stochastic discount factors at x are equal to the stochastic
discount factor induced by P via (13). We may thus equivalently write a constrained feasible
allocation (a,x,P) as the triple (a,x,π). For x ∈ |R
(S+1)I
++ and π ∈ |RS
++, let U(x,π) denote the
set of utility proﬁles U = (Ui)i∈I such that for all i ∈ I, Ui satisﬁes Assumption EU and agent i’s


























Proposition 2. (a,x,π) is a constrained feasible allocation if and only if4. Non-Marginal Firms and Second-Best Analysis 15











s = Ys, s ∈ S
(ii) U(x,π) 6= ∅.
Proof: The result follows from the First and Second Welfare Theorems. 2
In the standard deﬁnition of an eﬃcient allocation, a ﬁctitious planner is assumed to examine
the current allocation to consider if there is another feasible allocation which is preferred by all
consumers: thus to decide whether or not the current allocation is eﬃcient, the planner must know
the utility functions of all agents. If ﬁrms do not know the preferences of agents—or more precisely,
do not know more about consumers’ preferences than that they are consistent with the observed
stochastic discount factor π—then to obtain a consistent deﬁnition of “constrained eﬃciency” the
planner should be restricted to the same limited information regarding consumers’ utility functions.
Since the planner knows less about the utility functions of consumers than in the standard setting,
the concept of an ineﬃcient allocation needs to be weakened: an allocation (a,x) with observed
stochastic discount factor π is said to be ineﬃcient if there exists another feasible allocation (˜ a, ˜ x)
which dominates the allocation(a,x) for all conceivable utility functions consistent with the observed
π, i.e. for all U ∈ U(x,π). More precisely
Deﬁnition 4. A constrained feasible allocation (a,x,π) is ineﬃcient if there exists an allocation











s = Ys,s ∈ S, such that, for every proﬁle of utility

















s), ∀ i ∈ I
A constrained feasible allocation which is not ineﬃcient is said to be constrained Pareto optimal.
This deﬁnition incorporates the constraint that the planner only has limited information re-
garding the preferences of the agents when he seeks to change the current allocation to one that
improves the welfare of all agents: he must be sure to improve the allocation for all potential utility
functions consistent with the observed vector of prices P (or equivalently stochastic discount factor
π) at the current consumption allocation x. Since for ﬁxed a, by the First Welfare Theorem, the
distribution of output among agents is eﬃcient, the only possible source of ineﬃciency is an inap-
propriate choice of investment at date 0. Note that only a standard feasibility constraint is imposed
on the dominating allocation: the planner does not need to respect market prices or agents’ budget5. Estimated Social Utility and FEU Equilibrium 16
constraints in reallocating goods. Also, since agents have strictly monotone preferences, w.l.o.g. a
social improvement is deﬁned as a strict improvement for every agent in the economy.
We will see that some similarity in the use of information by ﬁrms is needed to achieve a
constrained Pareto optimal allocation: otherwise ﬁrms’ investment choices are only eﬃcient in the
following weaker sense.
Deﬁnition 5. A constrained feasible allocation (a,x,π) is ﬁrm k-ineﬃcient if there exists an











s = Ys,s ∈ S, such
that, for every proﬁle of utility functions (Ui = (ui
0,ui















s), ∀ i ∈ I
A constrained feasible allocation which is not ﬁrm k-ineﬃcient is said the be ﬁrm k-eﬃcient.
An allocation is k-ineﬃcient if it is possible to improve on it by changing the investment of ﬁrm
k and the allocation to the consumers, leaving the investments of all other ﬁrms unchanged.
5. Estimated Social Utility and FEU Equilibrium
Constrained eﬃcient allocations cannot be found by maximizing a social welfare function since
this would require knowing the utility functions of the agents. We thus proceed directly by study-
ing whether there are marginal changes (da,dx) from a constrained feasible allocation which can
increase the utilities of all agents, for all possible proﬁles of their utility functions consistent with
the observed prices, i.e. for all U in U(x,π).
The analysis will make repeated use of the following relation which is the discrete equivalent of
integration by parts. Let X be a discrete random variable taking values (X1 < X2 < ... < XS)
with probabilities (ps)s∈S, and let F and G = 1 − F denote the associated distribution function








It is easy to verify that if h : |R → |R is a real valued function
E(h(X)) =
P
s∈S psh(Xs) = h(X1) +
PS−1
s=1 G(Xs)(h(Xs+1) − h(Xs)) (IP)
which we will refer to as the integration by parts relation.
The analysis also makes use of the monotonicity properties of a constrained feasible allocation
with respect to aggregate output described in Proposition 1. To exploit these monotonicity proper-5. Estimated Social Utility and FEU Equilibrium 17
ties it is useful to order the outcome space S =
QK
k=1 Sk by increasing values of the date 1 aggregate
output Y =
P
k∈K yk. More precisely the random variable Y induces a partition of the outcome
space S into equivalence classes on which the aggregate output is constant










Let Σ denote the set of distinct values of Y : for any σ ∈ Σ, s,s0 ∈ S lie in the same equivalence
class (s,s0 ∈ σ) if Ys = Ys0 = Yσ. Without loss of generality we can order the elements of Σ in
increasing order for Y : σ > σ0 =⇒ Yσ > Yσ0. We let Y and Y denote the smallest and the largest












ps(a), σ ∈ Σ





pσ(a), G(η,a) = 1 − F(η,a)
Consider a constrained feasible allocation (¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ π). Since (¯ x, ¯ P), with ¯ Ps = ps(¯ a)¯ πs, is a
consumption equilibrium with ﬁxed investment, by Proposition 1, ¯ x and ¯ π only depend on σ:
Ys = Ys0 = Yσ =⇒ ¯ xs = ¯ xs0 def
= ¯ xσ, ¯ πs = ¯ πs0 def
= ¯ πσ, and ¯ x increases with σ while ¯ π decreases












Ui(xi,a), i ∈ I
which is maximized at ¯ x when a = ¯ a. To see whether it is possible to make a marginal improvement
from (¯ a, ¯ x) by changing ﬁrm k’s investment, consider a marginal change dak followed by a reallo-
cation (dxi)i∈I of the agents’ consumption streams: such a change is feasible if
P
i∈I dxi




s ≤ 0. If there is a feasible change (dak,(dxi)i∈I) such that dWi > 0, for all i and every
proﬁle (Ui)i∈I ∈ U(¯ x, ¯ π), then (¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ π) is constrained ineﬃcient.
There is no loss of generality in assuming that the date 1 change dxi
1 = 0 for all agents since
the date 1 aggregate resources do not change and these resources are shared eﬃciently at ¯ x: there
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where Gak denotes the partial derivative of the upper cumulative function G with respect to ak.
Given the monotonicity properties of ¯ x, even though the planner does not know Ui he can use the




















1(t)dt, it follows that
¯ πσ+1(¯ xi










< ¯ πσ(¯ xi




ak respectively denote the supremum and the inﬁmum of Wi
ak for all admissible
utility functions Ui satisfying Assumption EU and such that the stochastic discount factor at ¯ xi is
¯ π. To ﬁnd Wi
ak and Wi
ak, we use (15) and deﬁne the two subsets of Σ
Σ+ = {σ ∈ Σ|Gak(Yσ,¯ a) > 0}, Σ− = {σ ∈ Σ|Gak(Yσ,¯ a) < 0} (16)
where for simplicity we omit the dependence of the sets on k, since ﬁrm k is ﬁxed for this local
analysis. Σ+ is the set of outcomes σ such that a marginal increase dak in the investment of ﬁrm
k from ¯ ak increases the probability that the production is greater than or equal to Yσ, while Σ− is
the set of outcomes for which the inequality is reversed. If, for example, increasing the investment
of the ﬁrm leads to a ﬁrst-order stochastic dominant shift in the distribution of its output, then
Σ+ = {1,...,Σ−1}, and Σ− = ∅. If increasing investment ak only leads to a second-order stochastic






Gak(Yσ,¯ a)¯ πσ(¯ xi




Gak(Yσ,¯ a)¯ πσ+1(¯ xi






Gak(Yσ,¯ a)¯ πσ+1(¯ xi




Gak(Yσ,¯ a)¯ πσ(¯ xi
σ+1 − ¯ xi
σ)
The bounds on the marginal beneﬁt of agent i from a marginal change (dak,dx) are then
dxi
0 + Wi
akdak < dWi < dxi
0 + Wi
akdak if dak > 0 (17)
dxi
0 + Wi
akdak < dWi < dxi
0 + Wi




ak ≥ 1. Consider a change with dak > 0, dxi
0 = −Wi
ak dak (so that
dxi
0 + Wi









0 + dak, the change is feasible
and, from (17), dWi > 0 for all i. In the same way, if
P
i∈I Wi
ak ≤ 1, consider a change with
dak < 0, dxi
0 = −Wi
ak dak. The change is feasible and from (18), dWi > 0 for all i ∈ I. We have
thus proved the following proposition:
Proposition 3: (FOC for CPO) Let (¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ π) be a constrained feasible allocation, let Σ+ and




Gak(Yσ,¯ a)¯ πσ(Yσ+1 − Yσ) +
X
Σ−




Gak(Yσ,¯ a)¯ πσ+1(Yσ+1 − Yσ) +
X
Σ−
Gak(Yσ,¯ a)¯ πσ(Yσ+1 − Yσ)
If (¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ π) is constrained Pareto optimal, then
Wak < 1 < Wak (19)
Wak represents the minimal present value of the social gain in expected utility of consumption
at date 1 from an additional unit of investment by ﬁrm k at date 0. If this minimal present-value
gain exceeds its marginal cost, which is 1, then it is worthwhile to increase investment: hence the
inequality Wa < 1 in (19). Wa is the maximal present value of the social gain in expected utility
of consumption at date 1 from an additional unit of investment by ﬁrm k at date 0 or, in absolute
value, the maximal present value of social loss in expected utility of consumption associated with
one unit decrease in its investment. If this loss is less that the marginal reduction in cost, then it
is worthwhile to decrease investment: hence the inequality 1 < Wa in (19).
As we saw in Section 3 the market-value criterion is close to the FEU criterion (8) when ﬁrms
are marginal. The inequality (19) is suﬃcient to give the sign of the bias in investment when the






sk − ak (20)
denote the ﬁrm’s market value viewed as a function of its investment ak. The natural competitive
assumption for this model is that the ﬁrm takes the investment ¯ a−k of the other ﬁrms as given as
well as the stochastic discount factor ¯ π. We show that if there are no external eﬀects among ﬁrms5. Estimated Social Utility and FEU Equilibrium 20
(Assumption NE of Section 3) and if each ﬁrm’s investment is productive in the sense of ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance, then maximization of market value leads to underinvestment.
Assumption FOSDk (ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance): Let psk(ak |s−k,a−k) =
p(sk,s−k)(ak,a−k)
ps−k(a−k)
denote the conditional probability of sk given (s−k,a−k). For ﬁxed (s−k,a−k), an increase in ak
leads to a ﬁrst-order stochastic dominant shift in the conditional probability of sk, i.e.












Proposition 4: (Market Value not CPO). Under Assumptions NE and FOSDk, if (¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ π) is a
constrained feasible allocation such that ¯ ak is positive and maximizes the market value M(ak,¯ a−k),
then Wak > 1.
Proof: see Appendix.
As we saw above, Wak > 1 implies that a marginal increase in ak, with an appropriate distribution
of the additional date 0 cost among the agents ( dxi
0 = −Wi
ak dak,i ∈ I) increases the utility of
all agents for every possible proﬁle of utility functions in U(¯ x, ¯ π). Thus Propositon 4 asserts that
market-value maximization leads to underinvestment.
Estimated Social Utility. Can we ﬁnd a criterion for the ﬁrms, which uses only available infor-
mation, and which when maximized leads to a constrained eﬃcient investment? Such a criterion
must incorporate the information on preferences conveyed by the stochastic discount factor ¯ π at a
constrained feasible allocation. By Proposition 1, ¯ πσ is decreasing in σ. Thus there exists a contin-
uous decreasing function φk : [Y , Y ] → |R of aggregate output which coincides with the discount
factor ¯ πσ for each value Yσ in [Y , Y ], i.e. φk(Yσ) = ¯ πσ,σ ∈ Σ. The simplest example of such a
function is the linear interpolation
φk(η) = ¯ πσ +
η − Yσ
Yσ+1 − Yσ
(¯ πσ+1 − ¯ πσ) if η ∈ [Yσ, Yσ+1], σ = 1,...,Σ − 1 (21)
If ﬁrm k chooses its investment ¯ ak so as to maximize the objective function
e V k(ak,¯ a−k) =
Z Y
Y
G(η,ak,¯ a−k)φk(η)dη − ak (22)
then condition (19) for a constrained optimal choice of investment will be satisﬁed. For ¯ ak will5. Estimated Social Utility and FEU Equilibrium 21











where we have exploited the property that G is constant on each interval [Yσ, Yσ+1). Since ¯ πσ+1 <
φk(η) < ¯ πσ whenever η ∈ (Yσ, Yσ+1), it follows that
¯ πσ+1(Yσ+1 − Yσ) <
Z Yσ+1
Yσ
φk(η)dη < ¯ πσ(Yσ+1 − Yσ), σ = 1,...,Σ − 1
which implies that inequality (19) is satisﬁed. To express the objective function e V k in a more
recognizable form, let us integrate φk to obtain the function




which is normalized so that Φk(Y ) = 0. Φk is a diﬀerentiable, concave, increasing function of
aggregate output. Using the (IP) relation, the objective function (22) can be written as










pσ(ak,¯ a−k)Φk(Yσ) − ak (24)
Thus if ¯ ak has been chosen to maximize (22), then the ﬁrm has chosen its investment to maximize
its contribution to the expected discounted utility Φk of date 1 aggregate output, net of the cost
of investment. Using the relation pσ(a) =
P
s∈σ ps(a) and Ys = Yσ for s ∈ σ, the function (24) can
be expressed equivalently as an expected utility on the outcome space S
e V k(ak,¯ a−k) =
X
s∈S
ps(ak,¯ a−k)Φk(Ys) − ak (25)
e V k is ﬁrm k’s estimate of the expected social utility of its investment in the following sense. When









is not known, but its derivative at the output levels Yσ,σ ∈ Σ, is equal to the known discount factor
(¯ πσ)σ∈Σ. Firm k chooses a function φk which coincides with these known values πσ at the points Yσ,
φk(Yσ) = ¯ πσ = Φ0
¯ x0(Yσ), “ﬁlling in” for the unknown values of the derivative of the social utility on
the intervals (Yσ, Yσ+1). This estimate φk of the derivative is then integrated to obtain an estimate
of the social utility function Φ¯ x0. There are of course many ways of passing a continuous decreasing
function through the points ((Yσ, ¯ πσ),σ ∈ Σ) and each will lead to a diﬀerent estimate Φk of Φ¯ x0.
The non-uniqueness of Φk implies that there can be many possible “second best” investment levels.5. Estimated Social Utility and FEU Equilibrium 22
Under Assumption NE, e V k can be expressed as an expected utility of ﬁrm k’s output













sk + Y −k
s−k)
Ψk evaluates the average social utility obtained from the ﬁrm’s output yk
sk, when it is added to the
total output Y −k of the other ﬁrms.
We are thus led to a concept of equilibrium in which ﬁrms are not required have more information
than that which can be deduced from the equilibrium prices.
Deﬁnition 6. Let E(U,w0,δ,y,p) be an economy with K ﬁrms satisfying Assumptions FS, EU,
and IN. (¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ P) is an ﬁrm-expected-utility (FEU ) equilibrium if
(i) (¯ x, ¯ P) is a consumption equilibrium with investment ¯ a and associated discount factor ¯ π
(ii) each ﬁrm k ∈ K chooses its investment ¯ ak to maximize its estimate of the expected social
utility of its investment
e V k(ak,¯ a−k) =
X
s∈S
ps(ak,¯ a−k)Φk(Ys) − ak
where Φk : |R+ → |R is a concave, increasing, diﬀerentiable function such that Φk0(Ys) = ¯ πs
for all s ∈ S.
In a strong FEU equilibrium each ﬁrm uses the same social utility function Φ¯ x0 which is the sup-









, while in the second-best setting,
since ﬁrms do not know agents’ utilities, each ﬁrm derives its estimate Φk of the social utility Φ¯ x0 to
form its expected utilitycriterion e V k. The diﬀerent estimates Φk of the social utilityfunction, which
in essence correspond to the diﬀerent proﬁles of utility functions in U(¯ x, ¯ π) that agents could have,
generate the upper and lower bounds Wak and Wak on the marginal beneﬁt of ﬁrm k’s investment
which appear in the necessary condition (19) for constrained optimality. The ﬁner the partition Σ
of the interval [Y , Y ], the smaller the possible diﬀerences in the estimated social utility functions
Φk, and the closer an FEU equilibrium will lie to an SFEU equilibrium. If the random variable Y
were continuous instead of discrete, and there were a continuum of markets indicating the value5. Estimated Social Utility and FEU Equilibrium 23
of the discount factor ¯ π(Y ) for every value of Y , then no estimation would be necessary and the
function Φ¯ x0 could be constructed from the observed equilibrium prices. To avoid the unrealistic
assumption of a continuum of markets we have adopted a discrete model to study the properties
of an economy in which investment aﬀects probabilities.
Will Firms Use the Objective Function f V k? An FEU equilibrium has two parts to it: agents’
choices of consumption ¯ x and ﬁrms’ choices of investment ¯ a. The choices in these two components
use market prices diﬀerently: we can suggestively write (¯ x, ¯ P) and (¯ a,(Φk)k∈K) to indicate that
consumption choices are made in a standard way using prices ¯ P, while investment choices use the
estimated social utility functions (Φk)k∈K constructed from the prices ¯ P. Can these two distinct
uses of prices in consumption and investment be a source of tension? After all, a ﬁrm’s choice
of investment determines not only how probability is spread across date 1 outcomes, but also the
proﬁt paid to its shareholders—perhaps initial owners would prefer that the ﬁrm focus on market
value rather than on the expected social utility of its investment.
Let (¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ P) be an FEU equilibrium with associated stochastic discount factor ¯ π. To study the

























denote the optimal consumption viewed as a function of a, where





is the market value of ﬁrm k, k ∈ K, and let Ui∗(a) = Ui(xi(a),a) denote the agent’s optimized
utility. If ¯ λi denotes the multiplier associated with agent i’s budget constraint in the FEU equilib-
rium, and if we use the competitive assumption that agents (like ﬁrms) do not perceive the eﬀect of



























ak denote the partial derivative of the utility function Ui and the market value
Mk0
with respect to ak. To simplify the discussion, assume that ﬁrms’ outcomes are independent
(an assumption stronger than NE) and that increasing investment in ﬁrm k leads to a ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominant shift in the distribution of its output and thus of aggregate output (FOSDk).5. Estimated Social Utility and FEU Equilibrium 24
In this case a change in ak does not aﬀect the market value of other ﬁrms Mk0
ak = 0 for k0 6= k.
Since in equilibrium ui0(¯ xi








s) + ¯ λiδi
kMk
ak(¯ a)
where Hi(ξ) = ui
1(ξ) − ui0(ξ)ξ, for ξ ∈ |R+. Note that Hi is an increasing function since Hi0(ξ) =
−ui00(ξ)ξ > 0. By Proposition 1, Ui∗























By FOSDk, Gak(Yσ,¯ a) is positive so that the ﬁrst term in the decomposition of Ui∗
ak is positive. As
is shown in the proof of Proposition 5 in next section, there exist utility functions Ui such that ¯ ak
maximizes
P
i∈I Ui∗(ak,¯ a−k)/¯ λi. Since for these utility functions
P
i∈I Ui∗
ak(¯ a)/¯ λi is equal to zero,
it follows that Mk
ak(¯ a) < 0.
Thus for each agent the change in welfare from an increase in investment by ﬁrm k involves
a positive term—the expected utility of consumption at date 1 increases faster than its cost—
and, if the agent is an initial owner of the ﬁrm, a negative term—increasing investment decreases
the market value of the ﬁrm, and hence the income that the agent receives as a shareholder. A
consumption equilibrium with ﬁxed investment (in Deﬁnition 1, or in part (i) of Deﬁnition 6) can
be thought of as an equilibrium on ﬁnancial markets in which agents trade securities whose payoﬀs
are based on the observable outputs of the ﬁrms—securities such as bonds, equities, options—which
satisfy full spanning with respect to the outcomes. It follows from the monotonicity property of the
allocations in Proposition 1 that, after trade, every agent will hold a positive share of each ﬁrm,
so that all the agents can be considered as “new” (i.e. after trade) shareholders of ﬁrm k in the
sense of Dr` eze (1974), even if there are not initial shareholders. For the particular proﬁle of utility
functions for which ¯ ak maximizes
P
i∈I Ui∗(ak,¯ a−k)/¯ λi, if ¯ ak were announced before the trading
phase and if unanimity of the new shareholders is required to change the production plan, then ¯ ak
would not be changed, since the “winners” from a change dak would need to spend all their surplus
to buy the votes of the agents in favor of the status-quo (i.e. to compensate the loosers from the
change). Thus if each agent had no more knowledge than the ﬁrm regarding the preferences of other
investors, there will not be a coalition of new shareholders who can plan to convene a meeting of
all shareholders and be sure to obtain unanimity for a change in the investment plan.10
10The criterion (25) has the same stability property than the Dr` eze criterion for the GEI model with incomplete
market (Dr` eze (1974)): since it is derived from constrained optimality, it maximizes the surplus of the agents who6. Normative Properties and Existence of FEU Equilibrium 25
However if the investment decision has to meet with the approval of the initial shareholders and
if the initial ownership is not spread among all the agents, the sum
P
{i∈I|δi>0} Ui∗
ak restricted to the









missing. In this case there may be unanimity among the initial shareholders to decrease investment
and increase the market value of the ﬁrm. This situation is however artiﬁcial since the initial
situation is qualitatively diﬀerent from that in the equilibrium, where the ownership of ﬁrms is
spread among all agents of the economy. If the two-periodmodel is viewed as a simpliﬁed description
of a “slice” of an on-going economy, it is more natural to consider dispersed initial ownership than
concentrated initial ownership for the type of public corporations to which this study applies.11
This being said, the stability property of ¯ ak is rather weak. If the investment decision is made
by a subgroup of agents for whom the market-value terms in (26) dominate the terms in Hi, the
ﬁrm is more likely to maximize market value than the expected social utility of its proﬁt. Thus an
FEU equilibrium is probably better interpreted as a normative benchmark for what ﬁrms “should
do” rather than a positive description of what they will do in practice. If this is the case, then the
analysis of this paper highlights circumstances where subsidization of the investment of some ﬁrms
may be welfare improving for the economy.
6. Normative Properties and Existence of FEU Equilibrium
Without making any further assumptions it can be shown that an FEU equilibrium is ﬁrm-k
optimal, for any ﬁrm k ∈ K: additional assumptions are needed to prove that it is constrained
Pareto optimal. The proofs of these normative properties are based on the following Lemma,
which asserts that if a feasible allocation has the property that each agent’s consumption stream
is co-monotone with aggregate output, then any concave increasing function of aggregate output
can be decomposed into the sup-convolution of utility functions (vi)i∈I such that, for these utility
functions, the allocation is the optimal distribution of the aggregate output among the agents.
Lemma 1. Let Ψ : |R+ → |R be a concave, increasing, diﬀerentiable function satisfying the Inada
condition. Let ¯ x = (¯ x1,..., ¯ xI) be I vectors in |RS
++ with increasing co-ordinates ( s > s0 =⇒
¯ xi
s > ¯ xi
s0) and let ys be deﬁned by
P
i∈I ¯ xi
s = ys, s = 1,...,S. There exist I concave, increasing,
consume the production of the ﬁrm, and there cannot be unanimity of these agents in favor of a change, even if
transfers payments are allowed (see Magill-Quinzii (1996) for a more developed exposition of this stability property).
11The model with concentrated initial ownership and diﬀuse “new” ownership corresponds to the moment where
the ﬁrm goes public. At this exceptional time in the life of the ﬁrm, market value maximization is more likely to be
applied than expected utility maximization.6. Normative Properties and Existence of FEU Equilibrium 26
diﬀerentiable functions vi : |R+ → |R satisfying the Inada condition such that
(i) for all y ≥ 0, Ψ(y) = max{
P
i∈I vi(xi)|xi ∈ |R+,
P






Proposition 5. Under Assumptions FS, IN and EU, a ﬁrm-expected-utility equilibrium allocation
is ﬁrm-k optimal, for all k ∈ K.
Proof : Let ¯ U denote the “true” proﬁle of utility functions and let (¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ P) be an FEU equilibrium
of the economy E(¯ U,w0,δ,y,p), with associated discount factor ¯ π and utility functions (Φk)k∈K
for the ﬁrms. Suppose (¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ π) is not ﬁrm k-optimal, then there exists an alternative allocation















s = Ys, s = 1,...S















s), i ∈ I (27)
To simplify notation, let ¯ z =
P
k0∈K ¯ ak0 denote the total investment in the FEU equilibrium and
let z = ak +
P
k06=k ¯ ak0 denote the total investment in the improving allocation. For each i ∈ I, let











s = e xi
σ, s ∈ σ, ∀σ ∈ Σ
(a, e x) is feasible and, since each agent is risk averse, for all Ui satisfying Assumption EU, Ui(e xi,a) ≥















σ), i ∈ I




0 denote the date 0 aggregate resources of the economy, and let Φ0 : |R+ → |R
be an increasing, concave, continuously diﬀerentiable function satisfying the Inada condition such
that Φ0
0(Y0 − ¯ z) = 1. Applying Lemma 1 (with S = 1 and the date 0 allocation ¯ x0) there exist
increasing, concave, diﬀerentiable functions (ui
0)i∈I satisfying the Inada condition, such that6. Normative Properties and Existence of FEU Equilibrium 27








0 = Y0 − ζ}






0(Y0 − ¯ z) = 1, for all i ∈ I, ui0
0(¯ xi
0) = 1. By Proposition 3 each agent’s equilibrium date
1 consumption ¯ xi
1 is a monotone increasing function of σ: applying Lemma 1 again, there exist
concave, increasing, diﬀerentiable functions, (ui
1)i∈I satisfying the Inada condition such that











σ), σ ∈ Σ
Since ui0
1(¯ xi
σ) = Φ0(Yσ) = ¯ πσ for all i ∈ I and all σ ∈ Σ and ui0
0(¯ xi
0) = 1, the utility functions
(Ui)i∈I = (ui
0,ui
1)i∈I lie in U(¯ x, ¯ π) so that the inequalities (27) are satisﬁed for these I functions.
Summing these inequalities over the agents and using (a)-(d) gives





















Since Φ0 is concave, Φ0(Y0 − z) ≤ Φ0(Y0 − ¯ z) + Φ0
0(Y0 − ¯ z)(¯ z − z) and, since Φ0
0(Y0 − ¯ z) = 1, it
follows that
Φ0(Y0 − z) − Φ0(Y0 − ¯ z) ≤ ¯ ak − ak (29)
(28) and (29) imply







contradicting the fact that ¯ ak maximizes the expected social utility ˜ V k given ¯ a−k. 2
To obtain further properties of an FEU equilibrium, assumptions of concavity with respect to
the investment of ﬁrms must be introduced. The following assumption prevents discontinuities in
the choice of investment by ﬁrms, which can lead to nonexistence of equilibrium.





is concave in ak and continuous in a.
This assumptionwas introduced in the principal-agent literatureby Jewitt (1988) (in the context
of one ﬁrm) to ensure that the expected utility of the agent is concave in eﬀort. It has a natural6. Normative Properties and Existence of FEU Equilibrium 28
interpretation in terms of decreasing returns to investment. Although our analysis does not require
it as an explicit assumption, the natural case to consider is where increasing investment ak increases
the probability of high outcomes for ﬁrm k. Since the output of ﬁrm k is added to the aggregate
output of the other ﬁrms, this can be formalized as the property that an increase in ak leads to a
second-order stochastic dominant shift in the distribution of aggregate output, which is equivalent
to the property that the integral (30) is increasing in ak. Concavity of the function in (30) with
respect to ak is then the assumption of stochastic decreasing returns to scale for second-order
stochastic dominance.
Lemma 2. If Assumption Ck is satisﬁed, then for any concave diﬀerentiable utility function Φk
the objective function e V k(ak,a−k) is concave in ak and continuous in a.
Proof. See Appendix.
By Lemma 2, Assumption Ck implies that ﬁrm k’s optimal choice of investment is an upper-hemi
continuous and convex-valued correspondence and this property is used below to prove existence
of an equilibrium. A stonger concavity assumption is required to establish the constrained Pareto
optimality of an FEU equilibrium.





is concave and continuous in a.
Assumption C is stronger than Assumption Ck for each k ∈ K, even if the ﬁrms’ outputs
are independent random variables. Consider an example with two ﬁrms, ﬁrms 1 and 2, with
independent outcomes, each with two possible outcomes, H and L. If p1(a1) and p2(a2) denote the
probabilities of the low outcomes, then Assumption Ck, for k = 1,2, requires that the functions p1
and p2 are convex. In the Appendix we show that Assumption C requires the product p1(a1)p2(a2)
to be convex in (a1,a2). A suﬃcient condition is that the functions p1 and p2 are log convex, i.e.
log(pk(ak)) is convex in ak, for k = 1,2.
Lemma 3. If Assumption C is satisﬁed, then for any concave diﬀerentiable utility function Φ the
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is concave and continuous in a, for a ∈ |RK
+.
Proof. See Appendix.
To use Lemma 3 to prove constrained Pareto optimality of an FEU equilibrium we need the
additional assumption that ﬁrms use the same estimated social utility function Φ.
Proposition 6. If (¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ P) is an FEU equilibrium of an economy E(¯ U,w0,δ,y,p) satisfying FS,
IN, EU, and C, and if Φk = Φ, for all k ∈ K, then (¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ π) is constrained Pareto optimal.
Proof. Since (¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ P) is an FEU equilibrium, for each k ∈ K, ¯ ak maximizes
X
s∈S
ps(ak,¯ a−k)Φ(Ys) − ak
Thus the ﬁrst-order conditions for maximizing V (a) in (31) are satisﬁed at ¯ a, and since V is concave
in a, ¯ a is a global maximum of V . Let ¯ π be the associated stochastic discount factor and suppose
(¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ π) is not CPO. Then there exists an alternative feasible allocation (a,x) such that for all
admissible utility proﬁles U ∈ U(¯ x, ¯ π), (27) is satisﬁed. Using the same argument as in the proof of
Proposition 5, choose Φ0 such that Φ0
0(Y0 −
P
k∈K ¯ ak) = 1 and use Lemma 1 to construct a proﬁle
of utility functions U = (ui
0,ui
1)i∈I ∈ U(¯ x, ¯ π) such that Φ0 is the convolution of (ui
0)i∈I and Φ is
the convolution of (ui
1)i∈I. Summing (27) over the agents for these utility functions and using the
properties of (Φ0,Φ) leads to a contradiction to the maximization of expected social utility V (a)
at ¯ a. 2
The assumptions needed to establish the constrained Pareto optimality of an FEU equilibrium
are strong. Joint concavity of the integral (30) is needed to ensure that maximization with re-
spect to each variable in V (a) implies global maximization. We have not succeeded in ﬁnding a
generalization of the condition for the two-ﬁrm two-outcome case to a sum of independent random
variables taking an arbitrary number of values, so it is diﬃcult to appreciate the strength of the
assumption of joint concavity. The case which we can solve suggests that the decreasing returns
to investment by each ﬁrm must be suﬃciently strong. The assumption that Φk is the same for all
ﬁrms may appear restrictive since there may be no obvious reason why all ﬁrms should “ﬁll in” the
missing information on marginal utilities in the same way. However if there is a conventional way
of estimating a function which is only known at a ﬁnite number of points—for example by linear
interpolation—then all ﬁrms may use the same function Φ to estimate social welfare.
Simplifying the proof of Proposition6—using the “true” utilities(¯ ui
0, ¯ ui
0) instead of using Lemma6. Normative Properties and Existence of FEU Equilibrium 30
1 to ﬁnd admissible utilities—leads to the Pareto optimality of a Strong FEU equilibrium under
Assumption C.
Proposition 7. If (¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ P) is a Strong FEU equilibrium of an economy E(U,w0,δ,y,p) satisfying
FS, IN, EU, and C, then (¯ a, ¯ x) is Pareto optimal.
Existence of Equilibrium. In an FEU equilibrium the “valuation” of a ﬁrm’s investment is made
in two distinct ways. Its choice of investment ak is based on the expected social utility criterion




sk + Y −k
s ) − ak
In the budget equations of the investors, where the present value of a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is one of the







These two valuations may not always be compatible, causing potential problems for existence of
an FEU equilibrium. For, while investors as a group beneﬁt more from the increase in expected
utility obtained by maximizing the criterion e V k than they give up by not maximizing market value,
maximizing e V k may sometimes lead the market value Mk to become negative. When this happens,
an agent with a small initial endowment wi
0 and a relatively large ownership share of the ﬁrm may
end up with a negative income, and this is incompatible with equilibrium.
There is a natural way of resolving this potential incompatibility. For the reason why agents are
better oﬀ when ﬁrm k maximizes e V k rather than Mk is that its investment has a positive externality
on all agents via the probability term p(a) in their expected utilities. If this external eﬀect is strong
enough to justify “overinvestment” to the point where the ﬁrm’s market value becomes negative,
then it seems natural to compensate the initial owners by making transfers to the ﬁrm which ensure
that its market value remains non-negative. Such transfers would need to be ﬁnanced by taxes: for
simplicity it is assumed that they are ﬁnanced by a uniform tax rate on the endowments wi
0 of all
agents.12 This suggests modifying the concept of an FEU equilibrium by introducing a tax rate
τ on agents’ initial incomes and a vector of transfers t = (tk)k∈K to the ﬁrms: for economies for
which transfers are not needed, the resulting concept is just an FEU equilibrium.
12The transfers could be chosen to ensure a minimum rate of return on the ﬁrm’s equity and/or the taxes could
depend on the level of income: under reasonable conditions this will not create diﬃculties for the existence of an
equilibrium.6. Normative Properties and Existence of FEU Equilibrium 31






















This leads to the deﬁnition of an FEU equilibrium with transfers.
Deﬁnition 5. Let E(U,w0,δ,y,p)be an economy satisfying AssumptionsFS, EU, and IN. (¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ P; ¯ τ,¯ t)
is an ﬁrm-expected-utility equilibrium with transfers (FEUT equilibrium) if
(i) each agent i ∈ I chooses ¯ xi which maximizes Ui(xi,¯ a) in the budget set B( ¯ P,wi
0,δi,¯ a; ¯ τ,¯ t)
(ii) each ﬁrm k ∈ K chooses the investment ak which maximizes its estimated expected social



















Adding taxes and transfers to a Strong FEU equilibrium leads in the same way to a Strong
FEUT equilibrium. Introducing taxes and transfers in this way, to cover cases where ﬁrms can
potentially have negative market values, allows us to establish existence of equilibrium.
Proposition 8. If E(U,w0,δ,y,p) is an economy satisfying Assumptions FS, EU, IN and Ck for
all k ∈ K, then there exists an FEUT and a Strong FEUT equilibrium.
Proof: see Appendix.
Example. Consider an economy with I consumers and K = 2 ﬁrms, where each ﬁrm has two
possible outputs y1 = (y1
L,y1
H) = (400,650), y2 = (y2
L,y2
H) = (500,700) so that the possible
aggregate outcomes are (Y1,Y2,Y3,Y4) = (900,1100,1150,1350). Firms’ outcomes are independent,
and ﬁrm k’s ability to shift probability away from its low outcome by investment is given by
pk(ak) = e−νkak, with ν1 = ν2 = 0.05. Since the functions pk are log-convex, Assumption C is






s), i = 1,2




0 = 1000 and
P
i∈I δi
k = 1,k = 1,2. This is a
representative agent economy, and if (a1,a2) is the investment of the ﬁrms, then the prices in the6. Normative Properties and Existence of FEU Equilibrium 32
consumption equilibrium with ﬁxed investment are Pσ = pσ(a)(
P
i∈I wi
0−a1−a2)/Yσ, σ = 1,...,4.
Since prices are independent of the distribution of income and each agent has a consumption stream
proportional to the aggregate output (
P
i∈I wi
0 − a1 − a2,Y1,...,Y4), in what follows we omit the
consumption component ¯ x = (¯ xi)i∈I of an equilibrium. The utility function Φ¯ x0 in (5) is, up to a
constant, given by Φ¯ x0(η) = (
P
i∈I wi
0−¯ a1−¯ a2)log(η), so that (a∗
1,a∗
2) is a Strong FEU equilibrium
if
a∗









pσ(ak,a∗−k)log(Yσ) − ak, k = 1,2
For the choice of parameters given above
a∗ = (55,46.8)
so that approximately10% of date 0 income is devoted to investment. If the agents’ utilityfunctions
are not known and both ﬁrms use the same linear interpolation (21), then (¯ a1,¯ a2) is an FEU
equilibrium choice of investment if
¯ ak = arg max
4 X
σ=1
pσ(ak,¯ a−k)Φk(Yσ) − ak, k = 1,2




0 − ¯ a1 −¯ a2)( 1
Yσ + 1
Yσ+1)(Yσ+1 −Yσ).
The FEU equilibrium choice of investment is
¯ a = (55.1,46.9)
which only marginally exceeds the ﬁrst-best investment level.13
All the FEU equilibria correspond to investments (˜ a1,˜ a2) which are optimal given estimated
utility functions (Φk,k = 1,2) satisfying
P
i∈I wi
0 − ˜ a1 − ˜ a2
Yσ+1
(Yσ+1 − Yσ) < Φk(Yσ+1) − Φk(Yσ) <
P
i∈I wi
0 − ˜ a1 − ˜ a2
Yσ
(Yσ+1 − Yσ)




0 − ˜ a1 − ˜ a2)(0.01 1
Yσ + 0.99 1
Yσ+1)(Yσ+1 − Yσ), while ﬁrm 2 adopts the “high estimate” Φ2
deﬁned by permuting the weights 0.01 and 0.99, then the FEU investment is
˜ a = (52.5,49.8)




0 − ¯ a1 − ¯ a2)/η is a convex function of η, φ
k(η) > π(η) for Yσ < η < Yσ+1. The function
chosen by the ﬁrms slightly exaggerates the increases in social welfare so that the investment is marginally too high.7. Conclusion 33
Firm 1 underestimates the increases in utility and thus invests less than in the ﬁrst best, while ﬁrm
2 overestimates the increases in utility and overinvests relative to the ﬁrst best. Is the investment




σ=1 p(a)Φλ,µ,ν(Yσ), k = 1,2, where the functions Φλ,µ,ν are such that Φλ,µ,ν(Y1) = 0 and












0 − ˜ a1 − ˜ a2)












0 − ˜ a1 − ˜ a2)












0 − ˜ a1 − ˜ a2)
for a grid of values (λ,µ,ν) ∈ [0, 1]3, and ﬁnd that in all cases ∂
∂a1
P4




σ=1 p(˜ a)Φλ,µ,ν(Yσ) so that a marginal transfer of investment from ﬁrm 2 to ﬁrm 1 would
improve social welfare for any admissible proﬁle of utility functions. Thus the assumption that
ﬁrms use the same estimate Φk of the social utility function seems to be an unavoidable condition
for the constrained Pareto optimality result of Proposition 6. If instead ﬁrm 1 adopts the “high
estimate” and ﬁrm 2 uses the “low estimate” then the equilibrium investment is ˜ a = (57.6,44).
This suggests that even though there is a continuum of FEU equilibria, the equilibrium investment
levels lie in the relatively restricted intervals [52, 58] for ﬁrm 1 and [44, 50] for ﬁrm 2. Since the
market value of each ﬁrm is positive in each of these equilibria, no transfers are required.
The diﬀerence between investment in the ﬁrst-best equilibrium and in a market-value maximiz-
ing equilibrium is much more pronounced. If ﬁrms behave “competitively” and take the discount
factor ¯ π as given, then (ˆ a1,ˆ a2) is a market-value maximizing choice of investment if











− ak, k = 1,2
(ˆ a1,ˆ a2) = (36.9,24.7), so that ˆ a1 is about 1/2 and ˆ a2 about 1/3 of the ﬁrst-best investment. If
ﬁrms behave “non-competitively” and explicitly take into account the eﬀect of their investment on
¯ π, then the market-value maximizing investment becomes (¯ ¯ a1,¯ ¯ a2) = (25.8,12.8): since increasing
investment reduces ¯ π, their investment is reduced even further.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have studied a probability approach to modeling equilibrium in a production
economy under uncertainty in the setting of a one good economy in which investment by ﬁrmsAppendix 34
inﬂuences the probability distributions of their outcomes. We found that in such a model, the
objective function that each ﬁrm “should” maximize involves explicitly taking into account the
eﬀect of its investment on social welfare. To understand the role that prices play in such an
economy, we considered a setting where ﬁrms do not know the agents’ utility functions. We showed
how the information contained in prices can be used to estimate the social utility function and to
construct objective functions which lead to second-best choices of investment.
In the simple calculated example of the previous section in which each ﬁrm contributes about
half the risk of the economy, the diﬀerence in investment between the ﬁrst-best and the market-
value maximizing investment is substantial. However we have shown that if a ﬁrm is marginal its
objective is not far from market value. It seems likely that in a calibrated model with a larger
number of ﬁrms of more realistic sizes, the diﬀerence between ﬁrst or second-best and market-value
maximizing investment will be much smaller. It should be remembered however that this paper
is based on the strong assumption that markets span all the uncertainty in outcomes and that
agents have perfectly diversiﬁable risks. Intuitively, if agents have risks which are directly linked
to the random outcomes of the ﬁrms and if these risks are not perfectly diversiﬁable—labor risks
are a prime example—then the results of this paper suggest that ﬁrms should explicitly take into
account the risk consequences of their investment decisions for consumers, and that this could lead
to investment which diﬀers substantially from market-value maximizing investment. In order to
study these and related questions, the model in this paper needs to be generalized to an environment
in which agents face nondiversiﬁable risks. We plan to address these issues in future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4. We begin by showing that Assumption FOSDk implies Σ− = ∅. For any
subset E of the outcome space S, let |P(E,a) =
P
s∈E ps(a) denote the probability of event E. For
any ﬁrm k, we can decompose the aggregate output Y at date 1 into the sum of ﬁrm k’s output and
the total output of the other ﬁrms: Y = yk + Y −k. In view of NE, the upper-cumulative function
of aggregate output can be written as
G(η,a) = |P
h







yk > η − Y −k






p(s−k,a−k)Gk(η − Y −k
s−k; s−k, ak, a−k)Appendix 35
where Gk is the upper-cumulative distribution function of yk with the conditional probability
psk(ak|s−k,a−k). By FOSDk, Gk is an increasing function of ak and hence G, as a positive linear




Gak(Yσ,¯ a)¯ πσ+1(Yσ+1 − Yσ)






0 if η ≤ Y
Φ(Yσ) + ¯ πσ+1(η − Yσ) if η ∈ [Yσ, Yσ+1], σ = 1,...,Σ − 1
Φ(Y ) if η ≥ Y
By construction
Φ(Yσ+1) − Φ(Yσ) = ¯ πσ+1(Yσ+1 − Yσ), σ = 1,...,Σ − 1 (32)















since pσ(¯ a) =
P
s∈σ ps(¯ a). Let Rk(ak) =
P
s∈S ps(ak,¯ a−k)¯ πsyk
sk denote the present value of ﬁrm
k’s date 1 revenue. Since ¯ ak > 0 maximizes the market value M(ak,¯ a−k) the ﬁrst-order condition
Rk






















s−k) − ¯ π(sk,s−k)yk
sk
￿ (33)
is positive. When Y −k
s−k is ﬁxed, two consecutive values of yk correspond to two consecutive values
of the aggregate output Y . By (32)
Φ(yk
sk+1 + Y −k
s−k) − ¯ π(sk+1,s−k)yk
sk+1 = Φ(yk
sk + Y −k
s−k) − ¯ π(sk+1,s−k)yk
sk
and by the antimonotonicity of π in Proposition 1, ¯ π(sk+1,s−k) < ¯ π(sk,s−k), so that
Φ(yk
sk+1 + Y −k
s−k) − ¯ π(sk+1,s−k)yk
sk+1 > Φ(yk
sk + Y −k
s−k) − ¯ π(sk,s−k)yk
sk
Thus for s−k ﬁxed, the function sk → Φ(yk
sk + Y −k
s−k) − ¯ π(sk,s−k)yk
sk is increasing in sk. The ﬁrst-





psk(¯ ak |s−k,¯ a−k)
￿
Φ(yk
sk + Y −k




so that (33) is positive and the proof is complete. 2
Proof of Lemma 1. Let hi : |R+ → |R be deﬁned by
hi(y) =

      
















S if y ≥ yS
hi is continuous, increasing, diﬀerentiable on the intervals (0,y1), (ys,ys+1), s = 1,...,S − 1, and
(yS,∞), and satisﬁes
hi(ys) = ¯ xi
s, ∀ s ∈ S, hi0(y) =

        




if y ∈ (0,y1)
¯ xi
s+1 − ¯ xi
s
ys+1 − ys











hi0(y) = 1, y ∈ |R+
since
P
i∈I hi0(y) can be extended by continuity to |R+.
Since hi is increasing, it can be inverted; let (hi)−1 denote the inverse function which is also
continuous, increasing, and diﬀerentiableon the intervals (0,y1), (ys,ys+1), s = 1,...,S−1, (yS,∞).






We assume w.l.o.g. that Ψ(y1) = 0, so that we choose vi such that vi(¯ xi
1) = 0. Note that since Ψ0


















i∈I hi(y) = y and for all i, vi0(hi(y)) = Ψ0((hi)−1(hi(y))) = Ψ0(y), i.e. the derivatives of
the functions vi are equalized at hi(y), the solution to the maximum problem is ξi = hi(y) for all
i, and thus the value of the maximum is
P
i∈I vi(hi(y)). To show that
P
i∈I vi(hi(y)) = Ψ(y), note
that, by decomposing the integral in (34) into a sum of integrals over the intervals (¯ xi
s, ¯ xi
s+1) andAppendix 37






















s) = Ψ(ys). Also, since by (34) vi0(ξi) =
Ψ0((hi)−1(ξi)), and since by construction of hi, (hi)−1(ξi) → 0 when ξi → 0, vi inherits the Inada
property from Ψ, and the functions vi have the properties asserted in Lemma 1. 2
Proof of Lemmas 2 and 3. Let V (α,β) =
P
s∈S ps(α,β)Φ(Ys) − α1 where Φ : |R → |R is
a concave, increasing, diﬀerentiable function, ps(α,β) is a probability distribution depending on
parameters α ∈ |Rn,β ∈ |Rm, (Ys)s∈S is a real valued random variable with minimum value Y and
maximum value Y , and 1 is the unit vector in |Rn. Let Σ be an index set for the values of Y such
that σ > σ0 =⇒ Yσ > Yσ0, and for σ ∈ Σ, let pσ(α,β) =
P




pσ(α,β)Φ(Yσ) − α1 (36)











where φ denotes the positive, continuous, decreasing derivative of Φ. Being decreasing it is dif-




G(τ,α,β)dτ. Integrating (36) by parts leads to




Since H is concave in α, φ(Y ) > 0, −φ0(t) > 0, and the sum of concave functions is concave, V is
concave in α. It is also clear from (37) that if H is continuous in (α,β), V inherits this property.
Lemma 2 follows with n = 1,m = K − 1, α = ak and β = a−k while Lemma 3 follows with
n = K,m = 0 and α = a. 2
Assumption C in the Two-Firm-Two-Outcome Case. Suppose each of two ﬁrms (k = 1,2)
can produce either yk
L with probability pk(ak) or yk
H with probability 1 − pk(ak), the outcomes ofAppendix 38










It is easy to see that Assumption Ck is equivalent to pk being convex, for k = 1,2 (with two
outcomes there is no diﬀerence between ﬁrst-order and second-order stochastic dominance). Let
F(η,a1,a2) denote the (lower) cumulative distribution function of Y = y1 + y2. Assumption C is


















H]. Simple calculations lead to
M(η,a) =

     
     
(η − y1
L − y2
L)p1(a1)p2(a2) if η ∈ I1
(y1
H − y1
L)p1(a1)p2(a2) + (η − y1
H − y2










H)(p(a2) + p(a1)(1 − p2(a2)))
if η ∈ I3
Since the coeﬃcient of p(a1)p(a2) in the expression for M when η ∈ I3 is
(y1
H − y1









convexity of p1(a1)p2(a2) in (a1,a2) is necessary and suﬃcient for the convexityof M(η,a)in (a1,a2)
for all η ∈ [Y Y ].
If log(p(a1) and log(p(a2) are convex, then log(p(a1)) + log(p(a1)) = log(p(a1)p(a2)) is convex,
and p(a1)p(a2) is convex. 2
Proof of Proposition 8. We prove existence of an FEUT equilibrium: a simple adaptation
of the proof leads to the existence of a Strong FEUT equilibrium. To prove that there exists
(¯ a, ¯ x, ¯ π, ¯ τ,¯ t) satisfying (i)-(iv), we use the Negishi approach, showing that a correspondence Γ,
(α,a,t)
Γ
− →(˜ α,˜ a,˜ t) from a compact set (deﬁned below) into itself has a ﬁxed point which is an FEUT
equilibrium. α = (αi)i∈I is the vector of weights associated with a Pareto optimal distribution of
output, a = (ak)k∈K is the vector of investments by ﬁrms and t = (tk)k∈K is the vector of transfers





































with 0 < ￿ <
P
i∈I wi
0: thus ∆I is the simplex in |RI and DK
￿ is the set of investments by the ﬁrms
which assure at least ￿ units of consumption for the agents at date 0. We will show that when ￿ is
suﬃciently small, a ﬁxed point of Γ is an equilibrium.



































By Assumption EU, x(α,a,t) and the associated supporting price (1,P1(α,a,t)) (where P0 is
normalized to 1) is unique and the map (α,a,t) → (x(α,a,t),P(α,a,t)) is continuous. Any Pareto





k∈K ak, Y ) satisﬁes the monotonicity properties of Proposition
1, so that if πs(α,a,t) is deﬁned by Ps(α,a,t) = ps(a)πs(α,a,t) for s ∈ S , then π satisﬁes













and let ξ(α,a,t) be the excess expenditure map
ξi(α,a,t) = wi




k(P1yk − ak − tk) − Pxi, i ∈ I
where, for simplicity, the argument (α,a,t) of the functions x(α,a,t),P(α,a,t),τ(α,a,t) has been
omitted. By feasibility of x(α,a,t) and the deﬁnition of τ(α,a,t),
P
i∈I ξi(α,a,t) = 0.






, i ∈ I
Since πs(α,a,t) is Σ-measurable, let πσ(α,a,t) = πs(α,a,t) for s ∈ σ, and let φ(α,a,t) be the linear
interpolation
φ(α,a,t)(Y ) = πσ +
Y − Yσ
Yσ+1 − Yσ
(πσ+1 − πσ), for Y ∈ [Yσ,Yσ+1], ∀σ ≤ Σ − 1
where again the argument (α,a,t) of π(α,a,t) has been omitted. φ(α,a,t)(Y ) and its integral






Since πσ(α,a,t) is positive decreasing in σ, φ(α,a,t)(Y ) is positive and decreasing and Φ(α,a,t)(Y )
is an increasing, concave, diﬀerentiable function of Y . Consider the set ˆ Ak of optimal investment
choices for ﬁrm k (k ∈ K)














when the investments of other ﬁrms are a−k and Φ(α,a,t) is ﬁrm k’s utility function. By Assumption
Ck and Lemma 2, ˆ Ak(α,a,t) is a convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. To ensure
that the second component of Γ lies in DK
￿ , we project ˆ A(α,a,t) =
Q
k ˆ Ak(α,a,t) onto DK
￿ . The
second component of the correspondence Γ is thus
˜ a ∈ ˜ A(α,a,t) = projDK
￿ ( ˆ A(α,a,t))
and the third component is deﬁned by
˜ tk(α,a,t) = min{θk ∈ |R+ |P1(α,a,t)yk − ak + θk ≥ 0}, k ∈ K
Since P1(α,a,t)yk > 0, ˜ tk(α,a,t) ≤ ak and since a ∈ DK
￿ , ˜ t(α,a,t) = (˜ tk(α,a,t))k∈K lies in DK
￿ .
By the Kakutani ﬁxed point theorem, Γ has a ﬁxed point (α∗,a∗,t∗). Let us show that for ￿ suf-
ﬁciently small, (a∗,x∗,π∗,τ∗,t∗), where x∗ = x(α∗,a∗,t∗), τ∗ = τ(α∗,a∗,t∗), and π∗ = π(α∗,a∗,t∗),
is an FEUT equilibrium in which the common utility function of the ﬁrms is Φ(α∗,a∗,t∗), for all
k ∈ K.
By construction properties (iii) and (iv) of an FEUT equilibrium are satisﬁed, so that it remains
to show that (i) and (ii) hold. To show that (i) is satisﬁed, we show that ξi(α∗,a∗,t∗) = 0 for all i.
This, combined with the ﬁrst-order conditions for the maximum problem (38), implies that for all
i, xi∗ is the solution of agent i’s maximum problem (i).
Let ξ∗
i = ξi(α∗,a∗,t∗), i ∈ I, and suppose that for some i, ξ∗
i > 0. Since
P
i∈I ξ∗
i = 0, there
must exist an agent j for whom ξ∗












by the ﬁxed-point property and since (1 +
P
i∈I max{ξ∗
i,0}) > 1, (40) implies that α∗
j = 0. By
monotonicity of preferences this implies that xj∗ = 0. Since τ∗ < 1, w
j
0 > 0 and the income from
the ﬁrms are non-negative, the excess expenditure ξ∗
j > 0, which is a contradiction. Thus ξ∗
i ≤ 0
for all i and since
P
i∈I ξ∗
i = 0, ξ∗
i = 0 for all i ∈ I.References 41
It remains to show that (ii) holds for the estimated social utility function Φ(α∗,a∗,t∗). The
only way this might not be satisﬁed is if a∗ is the projection of some ˆ a in ˆ A(α∗,a∗,t∗) onto Dk
￿






0 − ￿: let us show that






0 − ￿, since all marginal rates of
substitution are equalized, date 1 consumption increases with aggregate output for all agents, no
agent consumes more than ￿ at date 0 and one agent consumes at least Y /I in the worst outcome
at date 1, the vector of discount factors associated with the ﬁxed point of the correspondence Γ
with domain |D￿ is bounded by
π∗






, s ∈ S
This implies that φ(α∗,a∗,t∗) ≤ b￿ and Φ(α∗,a∗,t∗) ≤ b￿(Y − Y ), ∀ Y ∈ [Y ,Y ]. If an optimal choice
ˆ ak in ˆ A(α∗,a∗,t∗) is such that ˆ ak > b￿(Y − Y ) then
P
s∈S ps(ˆ ak,a∗−k)Φ(α∗,a∗,t∗) − ˆ ak < 0, while
the objective of ﬁrm k is positive if ak = 0. Thus the optimal choice is such that ˆ ak ≤ b￿(Y − Y ).
Since, when ￿ → 0, b￿ → 0, for ￿ suﬃciently small, ˆ a = (ˆ ak)k∈K ∈ Int∆K
￿ and coincides with its
projection a∗ on DK
￿ , contradicting the assumption that a∗ is on the boundary of DK
￿ . Thus for all
k ∈ K, a∗
k is the solution of the maximum problem in (ii) when ﬁrm k’s estimated social utility is
Φ(α∗,a∗,t∗), and thus (a∗,x∗,P∗,τ∗,t∗) is an FEUT equilibrium.
Note that in the case where the utility functions (Ui)i∈I are known the proof is the same except
that the interpolated function Φ in (39) is replaced by the known sup-convolution function. 2
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